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abstract: In this paper, I argue that Colin McGinn provides an unacceptable ac-
count of consciousness due to the inconsistencies between (1) the conjunction of 
the metaphysical assumptions of his nativism and the epistemic assumptions of his 
mysterianism and (2) his conception of identity . I also maintain that, although John 
Searle’s social constructivism may provide the most feasible counter-argument to 
these charges of inconsistency, Searle’s position cannot save McGinn’s account of 
consciousness due to the inadequacies of Searle’s version of external realism . As I 
see it, the only means to address the problems in McGinn’s and Searle’s views is by 
revising their version of external realism . I demonstrate that this is only possible if 
they adopt an external realist position that dispenses with direct realism and adopts 
physicalism . I maintain that this is the only means by which we can prove the ex-
istence of consciousness while at the same time accommodating its a priori and a 
posteriori character .
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Introduction
In the initial part of this paper, I argue that Colin McGinn’s account of con-
sciousness is untenable due to the inconsistencies between his mysterianist 
and nativist views . These inconsistencies can be traced to (1) the conflict 
in the conjunction of the metaphysical assumptions of his nativism and the 
epistemic assumptions of his mysterianism and (2) his conception of iden-
tity . In the next section, I provide a counter-argument to my position which 
highlights the role of constitutive rules in science . This counter-argument 
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attempts to salvage McGinn’s position by placing it vis-à-vis John Searle’s 
social constructivism .1 Consciousness understood as a biological and mental 
process plays a pivotal role in understanding how collective intentionality 
brings about institutional facts in Searle’s overall philosophy . The possible 
counter-argument to my position emphasizes that language is both a byprod-
uct of evolutionary processes and collective intentionality . If such is the case, 
language involves constitutive rules . Our scientific representations of brute 
reality2 are made possible by language . In effect, McGinn’s characterization 
of consciousness as a primitive object can be seen as a byproduct of the con-
stitutive rules in science . hence, it is reasonable to posit that consciousness 
exists as a primitive object in our scientific models of physical reality . Though 
this route seems promising, Searle’s (2010) characterization of consciousness 
and its byproducts is also problematic since his direct realism cannot support 
his view that external realism should serve as the default background of our 
epistemic inquiries . I also demonstrate that the same problem ensues from 
McGinn’s adherence to external realism .
Within this context, I conclude my discussion by suggesting a gen-
eral framework for external realism which does not rely on direct realism . 
I demonstrate that a cogent form of external realism can be established if 
we understand it in terms of the methodology of naturalism and its under-
lying hypothesis regarding the external world, physicalism . At this point, I 
introduce Nicholas Maxwell’s (2011) view that science works on an a priori 
conjectural assumption regarding the unity of its theories . I maintain that if 
we follow Maxwell’s position, we can provide proof via inference to the best 
explanation that consciousness exists both as a biological and mental state 
and that the functions of consciousness provide us evidential grounds to ac-
cept its existence .
The aforementioned claims merit an exposition and analysis for at least 
three reasons . First, it provides an initial attempt to piece together McGinn’s 
(1996, 2017) views about consciousness since The Character of Mind until 
Philosophical Provocations . This is of import since McGinn’s views regarding 
consciousness and its objects is considered to be one of the most well-known 
positions in contemporary philosophy of mind (Van Gulick 2014) . Second, 
majority of the analyses regarding McGinn’s position focus on the tenability 
1 I recognize that Searle himself does not label his position as a form of social construc-
tivism . Nevertheless, his explanation of social facts can be considered as a weak form of social 
constructivism since he maintains that, although there is a mind-independent world, we are still 
involved in the construction of social reality . 
2 I will be using the terms “brute reality”, “physical reality”, “concrete reality”, and “em-
pirical world”, interchangeably in this paper, although McGinn specifically uses the term “con-
crete reality” . Simply put, these terms as they are used in this paper refer to mind-independent 
reality . 
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of his scientific mysterianism and/or on the scientific evidence supporting 
his nativism . This paper, on the other hand, returns to the fundamentals of 
philosophical analysis by looking at the tenability of the conjunction of the 
underlying metaphysical and epistemic assumptions of McGinn’s views in 
terms of their consistency with one another . In other words, I am providing 
an analysis of the foundational assumptions of McGinn’s philosophy and 
along with that the tenability of accounts of consciousness (e .g ., Searle’s) that 
rely on direct realism as a premise of external realism . Finally, this paper is 
of import for it supplies an alternative view on how external realism can still 
provide a foundation for our accounts of consciousness, by equating it with a 
version of naturalism that accommodates the a priori/a posteriori distinction . 
This is important because, in most cases, how we connect the biological proc-
esses we associate with consciousness relies on its a priori characterization .
On McGinn’s Mysterianism and Nativism
In this section, I will lay down the basic assumptions behind McGinn’s ac-
count of consciousness . In the process, I will also point out the inconsistencies 
in his position, these being an inconsistency in the conjunction of his meta-
physical and epistemic assumptions (henceforth I1) and an inconsistency in 
his conception of identity (henceforth I2) . let me begin by laying down the 
basic assumptions of McGinn’s (1996, 2000, 2011, 2015, 2017) mysterian-
ism and nativism . his position can be presented in the following way:
(P1) Consciousness is a primitive entity that is fully unknowable to us 
because its essential nature is beyond our full cognitive grasp (Sci-
entific mysterianism) .
(P2) To be a primitive entity is to be a basic entity relative to other 
objects, wherein such an entity is characterized by its irreducibility 
to other objects as well as its universality and indispensability in a 
system .
(P3) Due to (P1) and (P2), one of the reasons why we cannot have full 
cognitive access to consciousness is because its individuations can 
never be based on metaphysical criteria, since identity is not an 
explanatory relation but merely a logical one .
(P4) Our genetic makeup has given us an innate sensory system, in-
nate primitive sensory concepts, and innate abstract and empirical 
knowledge which allows us to access and/or know consciousness 
and its objects (Nativism) .
(P5) Since consciousness is a byproduct of our genetic makeup, then 
consciousness along with its objects is not mental but material in 
nature (Panmaterialism) .
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(P6) From (P5), it follows that it shares the properties of other material 
objects and the primary quality that it shares with other material 
objects is that it is a form of energy which differs from other forms 
of matter, for it is of the sentient kind .
The merits of McGinn’s position are easy to point out . The combination 
of (P1), (P4), and (P5) above offers us a very charitable account not only 
of our faculties but also of the disciplines that we have created to account 
for how we access and understand ourselves and the external world . It is 
charitable since it recognizes that even if there are limitations to our cognitive 
capacities, these limitations still allow us to determine the basic stuff that we 
are made of . McGinn’s position is also attractive for its simplicity . It limits 
the objects in his system to the bare minimum . That is, everything is reduc-
ible to matter . In line with this, he also recognizes the efficacy and predictive 
accuracy of our current best scientific methods, as well as the utility of our 
current best scientific representations in helping us to arrive at a philosophi-
cal account of consciousness and its objects .
Despite these merits, I maintain that McGinn’s position is also fraught 
with inconsistencies . These can be traced to I1 and I2 . let us begin by dem-
onstrating I1 . I1 is a byproduct of the inconsistency between (P2), (P4), 
(P5), and (P6) above . We can derive McGinn’s metaphysical assumptions 
from (P2), (P5), and (P6) . Combined, they lead him to maintain that there 
is a mind-independent world whose components are all reducible to matter . 
It also leads him to claim that, although we may not know the exact configu-
rations of matter, there is an initial distinction we can make regarding this 
substance: It is either of the sentient or insentient kind (McGinn 2011: 178) . 
We know this to be the case since consciousness, which he characterizes as 
a primitive object, is indispensable to a system . hence, it is indispensable in 
the external world itself . It is important to note that how he arrived at the 
metaphysical assumptions of his panmaterialism is intricately connected to 
the epistemic assumptions of his nativism and mysterianism (i .e ., P1 and P4) . 
his nativism leads him to posit that we have innate knowledge of a priori 
truths . he maintains, for instance, that a priori knowledge involves knowl-
edge of laws and how they are applied to matter (McGinn 2011, 2017) . It 
is due to this that he claims, “stuff-objects-laws-events” (what he refers to as 
SOlE) are “the basis of concrete reality” (McGinn 2011: 229) . It is also for 
this reason that he asserts that our knowledge of “[l]aws are conceptually ante-
rior to objects and stuff […] [hence], [e]ven if we do not know that objects 
exist, we know that they obey laws […], [f ]or laws are essential to our ideas 
of objects” (McGinn 2011: 213–215) . Combined, these claims lead to I1 . 
Consciousness must exist in order for us to make sense of external reality, 
yet consciousness as a primitive object can only exist if we have the concep-
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tual categories of “laws” and “object” . This is a circular argument . From his 
standpoint, the existence of consciousness as an object must be presumed to 
be ontologically basic in external reality, even if its existence as an object can 
only be conceptually conceived within a schema (i .e ., SOlE) which can only 
be affirmed if we posit the existence of consciousness .
At this point, we can move on to I2 . Recall that I2 arises due to the in-
consistency in McGinn’s view of identity . This is important because it shows 
the untenability of (P3) in our formulation of his position . Recall that (P3) 
maintains that we cannot use metaphysical criteria to determine the exist-
ence of consciousness, for it is a primitive object . McGinn (1996) maintains 
that as a primitive object, it is irreducible to any other object . Metaphysical 
criteria for its individuation are thereby unnecessary, for there is no need to 
provide identity conditions for a primitive object . This fits well with his over-
all philosophy since he does not perceive identity as an explanatory relational 
concept . For McGinn, identity is only a logical relation . he states:
But what kind of relation is identity, metaphysically speaking? […] Is it physi-
cal or mental? Is it causal or functional? Is it spatial or nonspatial? Where does 
it fit into our preferred set of allowable categories? Clearly, the answer is that it 
is none of the above . It is, for want of a better word, a logical relation […] . It is 
the only relation that has a claim to topic-neutrality, which is to say universal-
ity: identity holds of every entity in every possible world, and is part of our very 
framework of thought […] . [It is to be understood in terms of these properties] 
(i) it is unitary, (ii) it is indefinable, (iii) it is fundamental, (iv) it is a genuine 
relation . (McGinn 2000: 13–14)
At this point I2 arises, since McGinn cannot consistently maintain that iden-
tity is only a logical relation if he assents to the view that consciousness as 
a primitive object is also a form of matter governed by laws whose exist-
ence is affirmed in our scientific representations of the external world . That 
he adopts such a view about scientific representations is already implied in 
(P1), (P4), (P5), and (P6) . After all, these premises are reliant on his form 
of naturalism which heavily emphasizes the limitations of what we can ac-
cess in external reality .3 The problem with the conjunction of these premises 
3 For McGinn (2011), matter is the underlying substratum of all our experiences . his jus-
tification for the existence of matter, in this case, appeals to empirical observations and causal 
laws . Though laws may have a subjective component to them since how we understand them 
is governed by the intrinsic knowledge that we have as a result of our constitution as a species, 
laws as he describes them “do not underlie reality, or transcend it, or correspond to it; they are 
reality” (McGinn 2011: 215) . If we follow McGinn’s reasoning, they are “reality” since they 
are the projections of how our mind makes sense of brute reality . For McGinn, brute reality 
may be said to be one and the same with SOlE . In this view, scientific representations have a 
subjective and objective component to them . They are subjective because they are byproducts 
of how our innate concepts allow us to make sense of the external world, yet they remain ob-
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with his conception of identity however, can be seen in how he establishes 
the “objecthood” of a form of matter . In order to establish the “objecthood” 
of a form of matter, we must first be privy to the different instantiations of 
that object . In this case, if consciousness is a form of matter, it is insufficient 
to state that it is a primitive object by definition . We must first encounter 
different instantiations of what we refer to as “consciousness” before we can 
ascertain what it is . As such I2 arises because it is inconsistent for McGinn to 
characterize identity merely as a logical relation . he must also characterize it 
as an explanatory relation . It is an explanatory relation, for what explains the 
identity of an object are the entities or set of entities that makes it the object 
that it is .4
In this section, I laid down the basic assumptions of McGinn’s account 
of consciousness while in the process showing their inconsistencies through 
I1 and I2 . Recall that I1 maintains that McGinn’s metaphysical and epistemic 
assumptions lead to a circular account of consciousness, whereas I2 maintains 
that McGinn’s position is inconsistent since its metaphysical and epistemic 
assumptions require him to maintain that identity is not merely a logical rela-
tion, it is also an explanatory relational concept .
Saving McGinn: 
An Appeal to John Searle’s Social Constructivism
In what follows, I will attempt to save McGinn’s position from I1 and I2 by 
placing it side by side with John Searle’s social constructivism . In the process, 
I will demonstrate that even if Searle’s position cannot save McGinn’s views 
from one of the charges of inconsistency in the previous section, Searle’s ac-
count of consciousness allows us to see that the problem with both their 
views lies in their adherence to an external realist position that is reliant on 
direct realism .
As I see it, one of the most feasible means of addressing the inconsisten-
cies in McGinn’s position mentioned in the prior section is by resorting to the 
role of constitutive rules in the formation of a system . John Searle famously 
characterizes constitutive rules in the following way:
jective, for they are “structurally isomorphic” to the external world (McGinn 2015: 81–82) . 
It is for this reason that he characterizes physics primarily through its mathematical structure 
because physics can be seen as the manifestation of how our innate knowledge of a priori laws 
allows us to represent SOlE . 
4 It is important to note that I am not attempting to equivocate on the concept of “iden-
tity” . I recognize that we are faced with two senses of the concept as we have been using it so far . 
On the one hand, it is a logical relation and as such it is applicable to the truth-value of propo-
sitions . On the other hand, it refers to individuality . What I am concerned here is with the 
application of identity as an explanatory relation that allows us to determine individuality .
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Constitutive rules constitute (and also regulate) an activity, the existence of 
which is logically dependent on the rules[…] . [T]hey are almost tautologi-
cal in character, for what the “rule” seems to offer is part of a definition […] . 
That such statements can be construed as analytic is a clue to the fact that the 
rule in question is a constitutive one […] . Within systems of constitutive rules 
[…] some will have the form […] “X counts as Y in context C” . (Searle 1969: 
34–35)
If we place McGinn’s position vis-à-vis Searle’s characterization of constitu-
tive rules, then it seems that we can counter my charges of inconsistency 
to McGinn’s position in the previous section . McGinn’s primitive objects 
can be seen as a byproduct of a constitutive rule in science . As per Searle’s 
characterization of a constitutive rule, we can maintain that consciousness, 
which is a part of SOlE, counts as a primitive object in the context of our 
scientific representations of the concrete world . In effect, there is no problem 
if McGinn presupposes that since consciousness is a primitive object then it is 
ontologically basic prior to a schema and within a schema itself, hence refut-
ing I1 . Since Searle maintains that constitutive rules also offer an analytic def-
inition of “Y in context C” then it seems that McGinn’s characterization of a 
primitive object may also count as an analytic definition within our scientific 
theories . This is in accordance with McGinn’s characterization of identity as 
a logical relation, for now what is being emphasized is the analytic nature of 
the definition of a primitive object . hence, we have now refuted I2 .
Juxtaposing McGinn’s view with Searle’s view of constitutive rules also 
allows us to highlight one of the important aspects of McGinn’s account of 
consciousness – namely, that we have evolved in such a way that we have 
innate knowledge of analytic truths (i .e ., P4) . Returning to this aspect of 
McGinn’s philosophy is crucial at this point, for he maintains that our innate 
knowledge of analytic truths is not just a byproduct of our constitution as 
a species . We can consistently maintain that as per McGinn’s view, we in-
nately know analytic truths because we are a part of SOlE . In other words, 
we innately know analytic truths because we are a part of their truth-maker . 
In this sense, analytic truths are not only true by definition but also because 
they correspond to concrete reality and we know that such is the case because 
our faculties allow us to have an actual grasp of their truth-makers . McGinn 
states:
[O]ur cognitive faculties fit the world in its broadest outlines […] . The world 
divides into two compartments and our mind divides into two compartments, 
and the compartments march in parallel: the a priori compartment of the world 
maps onto the a priori compartment of our mind, and the a posteriori compart-
ment of the world maps onto the a posteriori compartment of our mind […] . 
We view the world through the lens provided by our epistemic faculties, but the 
world invites us to view it that way . (McGinn 2017: 126–127)
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Within this context, scientific theories can be understood as corresponding 
to SOlE because of their structural isomorphism to SOlE . That is, our sci-
entific models of physical reality, due to their a priori character (i .e ., they 
are either formulated in terms of a set-theoretic or mathematical model), are 
capable of capturing SOlE . In this sense, even if the constitutive rules of 
science regarding the formation of primitive objects are based on collective 
intentionality, the a priori character of constitutive rules and their byproducts 
show how they are formed due to our innate objective access to the physical 
world (i .e ., there is a side to our epistemic subjectivity that can capture and 
have direct correspondence with physical reality) . In this context, conscious-
ness, which is a biological and mental process (and hence a brute fact) counts 
as a primitive object (and hence a social fact) in science because the method-
ology used by science (as a discipline concerned with physical facts) is built 
up on an epistemic framework whose structural isomorphism to concrete 
reality allows it to capture the a priori aspects of physical reality .
It would not be remiss to associate this with Searle’s position, for Searle 
himself notes the interrelationship of physical and social facts in our scientific 
theories as he expounds on the relationship of his biological naturalism and 
social constructivism in the following:
Our task is to give an account of how we live in exactly one world, and how all 
of these different phenomena, from quarks and gravitational attraction to cock-
tail parties […] are part of that one world […] . [Our account] must respect the 
basic facts of the structure of the universe . These basic facts are given by physics 
and chemistry, by evolutionary biology and the other natural sciences . We need 
to show how all the other parts of reality are dependent on, and in various ways 
derive from, the basic facts […] . [T]he two most fundamental sets of basic facts 
are the atomic theory of matter and the evolutionary theory of biology […] . 
Our capacity for consciousness and other mental phenomena is the result of 
long periods of biological evolution . Collective mental phenomena of the sort 
we get in organized societies are themselves dependent on and derived from the 
mental phenomena of individuals . (Searle 2010: 3–4)
In this case, constitutive rules may be seen as operating within our scientific 
models of brute reality, for our scientific models must presuppose certain on-
tic assumptions in order for them to begin creating representations of physi-
cal reality . In Searle’s case, for example, evolutionary biology must presuppose 
that consciousness exists as a brute fact in order for us to even make sense 
of the distinction between physical and social reality as well as physical and 
social facts . We have shown how this is possible earlier when we maintained 
that the language of science must adhere to a constitutive rule that conscious-
ness counts as a primitive object in our scientific representations of the ex-
ternal world, for these representations cannot be formed unless we presume 
otherwise .
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At this juncture, it is crucial to point out that McGinn’s and Searle’s views 
also coalesce because they both adopt external realism . Douglas McDermid 
provides an instructive Searlian description of external realism as he states:
[It is] [t]he thesis that “there exists a real world that is totally independent of hu-
man beings and of what they think or say about it” [43, p .13] or, alternatively, 
that “there is a way that things are independently of our representations” [43, 
p .31] . That is, the world is independent of our representations, perceptions, 
minds, languages, or conceptual schemes […] . External realism is not a theory 
[43, p .32] but is instead what he calls a “default position”, that is, a fundamen-
tal presupposition of inquiry and discourse which we hold prereflectively and 
which forms part of the so-called “Background” of our thought and language .5 
(McDermid 2001: 1–2)
That McGinn adopts these views is already evident in (P1), (P4), and (P5) 
of our formulation of his position as well as in his claim that a priori/a poste-
riori truths have a mind-independent truth-maker . Setting these aside, what 
is of import in McDermid’s description of Searle’s position is that he shows 
how Searle conceives direct realism as the “default position” of our epistemic 
inquiries (McDermid 2004: 2) . That Searle holds such a view is evident in 
his biological naturalism . For Searle (2010), consciousness as a neural process 
allows us to directly perceive the objects in our surroundings . Searle (2010) 
also maintains that the role of science is only to provide us with the causal 
link between our neural processes and their depictions of physical reality . 
That McGinn holds the same view regarding consciousness can also be seen 
in his claim that regardless if we are unaware of the “inner nature of matter”, 
we are aware of its “outer/functional properties” (McGinn 2011: 70) .
Although, at face value, direct realism seems to give us an intuitive ac-
count of how we can have background assumptions of the physical world, 
Searle’s description of direct realism cannot be used to support external real-
ism . Direct realism understood as the view that we have direct access to the 
physical substratum of the mind-independent world is an inconsistent posi-
tion . At this point, we return to I2 . If we wish to establish that we have direct 
access to a mind-independent world, it can only be done within the context 
of a theory that uses an empirical methodology, for it is only through em-
pirical means that we can accumulate data that will provide justification for 
our ability to access a mind-independent world . Searle, like McGinn, cannot 
conflate metaphysical criteria with epistemic criteria . That is, they cannot use 
metaphysical criteria as the bases for their epistemic criteria that attempts to 
demonstrate that there can be a causal link between our minds and the exter-
nal world . In McGinn’s case, as well, we cannot use metaphysical criteria to 
5 In the quote, “[43]” refers to John Searle’s Mind, language, and Society: Philosophy in 
the Real World (Basic Books, New York, 1998) .
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elaborate on the functional properties of matter, for we need to accumulate 
empirical evidence to provide epistemic justification that an object functions 
in a particular way .
Given that Searle’s social constructivism is based on the presumption 
that direct realism can support external realism, his position cannot save 
McGinn from I2 since he is now prone to a circular characterization of physi-
cal facts and social facts . Physical facts are supposed to have a mind-inde-
pendent source compared to social facts . Yet, as we have shown, we must use 
the empirical methodology of science in order to make sense of physical facts . 
hence, we are left to ponder whether physical facts are really mind-independ-
ent in the sense that Searle needs in order for him to say that they correspond 
to our prereflective views of the external world .
In this section, I showed that even if Searle’s social constructivism can 
save McGinn’s account of consciousness from I1, it cannot save it from I2 . 
I have also shown that Searle’s position is liable to I2 . In addition, I demon-
strated how I2 is a result of McGinn’s and Searle’s adherence to an external 
realist position that is reliant on direct realism .
Conclusion: A Reformulation of External Realism
The discussion so far has led us to conclude that the problem with McGinn’s 
and Searle’s theories of consciousness is, at bottom, a problem with the un-
derlying framework that they used to ascertain and explain the existence as 
well as the functions of consciousness . At this point, I will attempt to provide 
a solution to their predicament by describing a version of external realism 
that can accommodate the meritorious aspects of both McGinn’s and Searle’s 
conception of consciousness without tying external realism to direct realism . 
however, at the onset, it is important to note that contrary to Searle, I am 
positing that external realism cannot merely serve as a background assump-
tion that is non-theoretical in character, since if we wish to establish the 
relationship between physical facts and their truth-makers in the external 
world, we must have a theory that allows us to determine the correspondence 
conditions between the two .
An alternative to direct realism is Quinean naturalism, the view that we 
should look to science to determine what we ought to believe, for so far, it has 
provided us with the best methodologies and theories that allow us to predict 
and explain natural phenomena (Quine 1951) . Based on this description, 
naturalism can be understood in terms of its methodology and the objects to 
which this methodology is applied . Its methodology is that of empiricism and 
its ontology is that of physicalism . Richard Schuldenfrei (2000) notes that it 
is crucial to recognize that since empiricism is a tentative finding in science 
and physicalism is a hypothesis of what exists in Quinean naturalism, both 
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are prone to falsification depending on the results of scientific developments . 
At the moment, the methodology and the ontology of Quinean naturalism 
have yet to be disproved .
however, there is an aspect to the methodology of Quinean naturalism 
that is prone to difficulties . That is, its denial of the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction . Though the dissolution of this distinction is partly pragmatic 
in character, Quine’s (1951) description of the boundary conditions of sci-
ence is too rigid to the effect that it removes the theoretical character of the 
discipline . Jaakko hintikka offers this observation in the following:
[We need] a finer distinction, viz . a distinction between regular data, bound-
ary conditions, and background theories, not giving up all distinctions . In not 
distinguishing from each other different applications of a theory, each with dif-
ferent boundary conditions, Quine is at bottom construing science as natural 
history rather than theoretical natural science . (hintikka 2000: 420)
If we follow hintikka’s view above regarding the need to introduce finer dis-
tinctions in science, we can accommodate an underlying assumption behind 
physicalism which Quine fails to do . That is, physicalism presupposes that 
there is an underlying unity in nature . That this presumption is held within 
science itself is evident in its attempts to create a unified theory .6 It is at this 
juncture that it is helpful to introduce Nicholas Maxwell’s view that physical-
ism works because it is based on an a priori conjectural assumption that there 
is unity in nature . he explains that the unification of theories in science is 
only possible if we make an a priori conjectural assumption that “the universe 
is such that no disunified theory is true which is not entailed by a true uni-
fied theory” (Maxwell 2011: 214) . Physicalism, in this sense, is perceived not 
merely as a hypothesis in science but as the background theory of all scientific 
inquiries . This is in accordance with external realism’s claim that there is a 
mind-independent world whose facts and/or objects are epistemically acces-
sible to us regardless of our fallibility .
Although what I have offered is a very general account of how we can 
save external realism while at the same time allowing it to account for the 
a priori/a posteriori character of consciousness, the merits of adopting this 
view can be seen in the following .7 First, it allows us to posit the existence of 
consciousness not because it is presumed to be a primitive object in our ontic 
inquiries but also because evolutionary biology has shown us its biological 
features . Second, it also allows us to use the methodology of empiricism (i .e ., 
to use an inference to the best explanation) to demonstrate that the need for 
6 For the sake of simplicity, we will focus on the epistemic and ontological character of 
a unified theory .
7 As I see it, the framework that I have offered can only be faulted if reductionism is 
equated with physicalism . This discussion however is beyond the scope of this paper .
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theory unification in science can be traced to how our consciousness directs 
its unity to its objects to the effect that it compels us to create a unified theory 
that accounts for the entirety of the external world . Finally, external realism, 
understood in the backdrop of naturalism and our underlying description 
of its physicalism, also allows us to incorporate the meritorious aspects of 
McGinn’s and Searle’s accounts of consciousness . In the case of McGinn, we 
can still retain how he considers the a priori/a posteriori aspects of our mind 
to correspond with the a priori/a posteriori aspects of external reality . In the 
case of Searle, we can retain the role of intentionality in the construction of 
social reality . In fact, it would not be remiss to state that via the function 
of intentionality in the construction of social reality, we can see how our 
consciousness guides us in creating a unified epistemic and ontic account of 
external reality . That our consciousness also allows us to access the world via 
theories structurally isomorphic to it coheres with the view that I am espous-
ing . That is, the a priori aspect of consciousness allows us to create a unified 
theory of the external world that is isomorphic to that realm . Unity after all 
is best conceived via set-theoretic or mathematical terms .
In this paper, I demonstrated that Searle’s social constructivism cannot 
save McGinn’s scientific mysterianism and nativism from one of my charges of 
inconsistency (i .e ., I2) . I concluded that the primary reason for the deficien-
cies in both theories lies in their adherence to direct realism as the supporting 
assumption of external realism . I also offered a version of external realism that 
is founded on physicalism . I maintained that if we wish to provide a cogent 
account of consciousness and its objects, it is necessary to build upon solid 
foundations . Ultimately, even if our concerns nowadays are in philosophy of 
mind, we must establish a cogent epistemological and ontological foundation 
that can accommodate our findings in evolutionary biology and cognitive 
science . These foundations should also be in accordance with the underlying 
assumptions of science as a whole .
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